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bility of the master to the servant himself, there is no apparent rea-
son for changing the meaning of the term to include scope of em-
ployment, when dealing with the liability of the master to a third per-
son for the tort of the servant.
From the foregoing we have seen that the two factors determin-
ing the liability of the master for the torts of his servant are sev-
erable in meaning and operation, one from the other, and cannot prop-
erly be applied to a set of facts in a singular form. The said set of
facts may fall within one term and without the other. Both tests may
apply to some cases. In others the master may be liable for acts oc-
curring in the course of employment but without the scope of employ-
ment; in still others he may be liable for acts occurring within the
scope of employment but without the course of employment, of
course, as in the motorcycle case, where one test applies the other
may be implied. The court might argue that since the authority was
extended to include the servant's ride home, the time and space
limits of the employment might also be implied to extend that far.
This would admit of the application of Mr. Mechem's single test. To
a careful thinker such reasoning must appear untenable. The mas-
ter's liability is not being contested in this case, but only that it
should be based on the double test. His liability is based on his sub-
sequent ratification, using for the moment the illustrative hypothesis
set forth above, and on that alone.
A standardization of terminology in treating this particular sub-
ject would not go amiss. The tests for the liability of the master for
the torts of his servant which have been separately treated herein
should be separately stated and separately applied to the cases as they
come up. Such a course would undoubtedly result in clarification of
the subject for the student.
HowAnD H. WITEHEAD.
EQUITY-MUTUALITY AS A BASIS FOR EQUITABLE RELIEF
A testator bequeathed his estate, consisting of corporate stock, to
his wife. One half thereof was to go to his mother, sister and broth-
ers should his wife marry again. Thereafter the widow contracted to
sell the stock; and upon the purchaser's refusal to perform she brought
suit for specific performance of the contract. The court granted spe-
cific performance without stating the ground upon which it was
given.'
Assuming that the widow had the right to sell the stock, upon
which ground was the remedy given, mutuality of remedy or the in-
adequacy of the remedy at law? The court's silence does not obviate
the uncertainty of its view. The question remains, will the Ken-
tucky courts grant specific performance to one party of the contract
'Harris, et al. v. New, et al., 167 Ky. 262, 180 S. W. 375 (1915).
STUDENT NoTEs
simply because the other is entitled to It? The writer believes that
this question should be answered in the negative.
The doctrine of mutuality, as it stands, has been discussed and
criticized considerably by judges and text writers in recent years.
Each develops a different theory, but apparently all reach the same
result.
The restatement of contracts states the doctrine in two parts2
(1) "The fact that the remedy of specific performance is not
available to one party is not sufficient reason for refusing
it to the other party.
(2) "The fact that the remedy of specific performance is avail-
able to one of the parties to a contract is not in itself suf-
ficient reason for making the remedy available to the other;
but it is of weight when it accompanies other reasons, and
it may be decisive when the adequacy of damages is diffi-
cult to determine and there is no other reason*for refusing
specific performance."
One can readily see that the doctrine of mutuality may be invoked
either as a basis for granting equitable relief or as a basis for deny-
ing it. The former is to be the thesis of the discussion, and will be
hereafter referred to as the doctrine of mutuality.
It is obviously expedient to quote the various theories proposed
by text writers. Ames invokes the analogy of the mortgagor-mortga-
gee relationship to that of the vendor-purchaser relation, to show the
impracticability of the doctrine of mutuality.
"In truth the vendor's right to specific performance has nothing
to do with the question of mutuality. The vendor from the time of
the bargain holds the legal title as security for the payment of the
purchase money and his bill is like a mortgagee's bill for the payment
and foreclosure of equity of redemption. This view is confirmed if we
consider the position of a vendor who has conveyed before the time
fixed for payment. He is now a creditor just as if he had sold goods
on credit, and there is no more reason why he should have a bill in
equity than any other common law creditor."'
The theory proposed that the vendor-purchaser relation is analo-
gous to that of mortgagee-mortagor breaks down in some instances.
The vendor under an executory contract holds legal title and is en-
titled to the rents and profits.5 Under the modern view of mortgages
the mortgagor holds legal title, the mortgagee having only a chattel
interest in the land.6 According to some cases, the vendor bears the
2Clark, Principles of Equity, Sec. 48; Horack, Specific Perform-
ance for the Purchase Price, 1 Iowa Law Bull. 53; -Ames, Mutuality in
Specific Performance, 3 Col. L. R. 1; Williston, V. 3, Sec. 1443.
3 American Law Institute, Restatement of Contracts, See. 372.
' Ames, 3 Col. L. R. 1, 12.
5 In re Boyle's Estate, 154 Iowa 249. 134 N. W. 590 (1912); Tucker
v. McLaughlin-Farroe Co., 36 Okl. 321, 129 Pac. 5 (1112).
6Walsh on Mortgages, Sec. 51, The Lien Theory of Mortgages in
the U. S.
KOTTUORY LAW JO1JIMAL
risk of loss under executory contracts unless the intention of the par-
ties is otherwise.6A If the vendor has conveyed and placed the pur-
chaser in possession the object of specific performance has already
been performed. Now the only relief desired by the vendor would be
the recovery of the purchase price.
The case of Jones v. NewhaZ17 stands for the proposition that
equity will not decree specific performance of a written contract for
the sale of land at the instance of the vendor, if all that is to be done
on the part of the purchaser is the payment of the purchase price.
Clark, Principles of Equity, Sec. 172, states the rule of mu-
tuality to be as follows:
"The doctrine of mutuality has apparently been invoked In favor
of vendors and purchasers, lessors and lessees In two classes of
cases. If the subject matter of the contract is such that the dam-
ages would be inadequate to the purchaser so that he would or-
dinarily have obtained specific performance, that is if the buyer's
common law remedy is inadequate, the court will not inquire into
the seller's common law remedy. The other is that of the rule of
part performance as taking a case out of the Statute of Frauds,
so that the purchaser could get specific performance."
The author goes on to say, at page 155, that
"the doctrine of mutuality is difficult to justify. It is an Illustra-
tion of the tendency of equity courts to limit the scope of discre-
tion and widen the field of fixed law."
The court decisions are obviously conflicting. Some hold that
mutuality alone is a sufficient basis for equitable relief. To state the
rule differently, if the contract is of such a nature that the purchaser
could have it specifically enforced, the vendor can do so irrespective
of the remedy at law.9 The rule is also invoked in enforcing perform-
ance of contracts for the sale of unique chattels
Many of the decisions in granting or denying relief do not men-
OA Lebman v. Lovenson, 236 Mass. 221, 128 N. E. 13 (1920); Thomp-
son v. Gould, 20 Pick.. (Mass.) 134 (1838) (dictum); Vanneman, 8
Minn. L. Rev. 127.
'115 Mass. 244 (1874).
BLewis v. Leckmere, 10 Mod. 503, 88 Eng. Rep. 828 (1720);
Adams v. Messenger, 147 Mass. 185, 17 N. E. 491 (1888); Adderly v.
Dixon, 1 Simons and Stuart 607 (1824); Cheale v. Kenward, 3 De Gex.
& J. 27 (1858); Kenney v. Wexhaux, 6 Maddack & Gidart 355 (1822);
Migatz v. Stieglitz, 166 Ind. 361, 77 N. E. 400 (1906); Rock Island
Lumber Co. v. Fairmont- Town, 51 Kan. 394, 32 Pac. 1100 (1893);
Spring v. Sanders, 62 N. C. 67 (1866); Raymond v. San Gabriel, Etc.,
Co., 53 Fed. 883 (1893); Hopper v. Hopper, 16 N. J. Eq. 147 (1863);
Anderson v. Wallace Lumber Co., 30 Wash. 147, 70 Pac. 247 (1902);
Morgan v. Eaton, 59 Fla. 562 (1910); Cobs v. Cole Realty Co., 169
Mich. 347,. 135 N. W. 329 (1912) ; Kipp v. Laim, 146 Wis. 591, 131 N. W.
418 (1911); Saint v. Beal, 66 Mont. 292, 213 Pac. 248 (1923).
*Young v. Collier, 31 N. J. Eq. 444 (1879); Phillips v. Berger, 8
Barb. (N. Y.) 527 (1850) (Contract for sale of judgment); Hills v.
McMunn, 232 Ill. 488,83 N. E. 963 (1908) (stock); Perin v. McGibbin,
53 Fed. 86 (1890).
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tion the rule; while others plainly indicate that mutuality Is not a
basis for relief.- The court says in the case of c/ksten v. Downing-
that equity enforces performance of a contract not on the ground of
mutuality, but on the ground that the plaintiff has not an adequate
remedy at law. The court granting specific performance in favor of
the vendor in the decision of Park et al. v. Koopman," says, "A court
of equity will uphold contracts for sale of land and enforce perform-
ance when they are entered into fairly, and with complete under-
standing on both sides. Under such circumstances the party who is
seeking specific performance having performed his part of the contract
will be granted relief, not as a favor bat as a matter of right."
It is sometimes urged as an explanation of the rule of mutuality
that the vendor's remedy at law is inadequate since it consists in the
recovery of damages, often more or less conjectural because of tke
frequent difficulty of proving actual value of the land representing
the difference between the stipulated price and the market valUe
Whereas in equity the complainant recovers the whole of the pur-
chase money." An adequate remedy at law, which will deprive a court
of equity of jurisdiction, is a remedy as certain, complete, prompt and
efficient to obtain the ends of justice as the remedy in equity.
In contracts for sale of land it is sometimes argued that the rea-
son the vendor may come into equity to recover, or enforce payment
of the purchase price is because a mortgage relation has been created
between the parties by the contract of sale.- It seems apparent that the
plaintiff could recover the purchase price in an action at law. If the
vendor had conveyed and placed the purchaser in possession, he would
retain a mortgage as security. 'Whether the foreclosure proceedings
are to be in equity or in law is usually governed by statute.
The Kentucky courts will decree specific performance of land con-
tracts in favor of the vendor.- If a purchaser fails or refuses to take
the property according to the contract the seller's remedy is a suit to
recover the purchase money, or in other words for a performance of
the contract." The vendor also retains an equitable lien on the land
"Eckstein v. Downing, 64 N. H. 248, 9 Atl. 626 (1887); Lone Star
Salt Co. v. Texas Shore Line Ry. Co., 99 Texas 434, 86 S. W. 355
(1905); Hickey v. Dole, 66 N. H. 336, 29 Atl. 792 (1890).
64 N. H. 248, 9 At. 626 (1887).
311 Ill. 350, 143 N. . 80 (1924).
Hodges v. Kowing, 58 Conn. 12, 18 AtL 979 (1859); Maryland
Clay Co. v. Simpers, 96 Md. 1, 53 Atl. 424 (1902); Old Colony R. Corp.
v. Evans, 6 Gray (Mass.) 25 (1856); Eckstein v. Downing, 64 N. H.
248, 9 Atl. 626 (1887).
"-'Boyce v. Grundy, 3 Pet. 210, 7 L. Ed. 655 (1830); Spring Field
Milling Co. v. Barnard & Lecs. Mfg. Co., 81 Fed. 261 (1897); Brown
v. Arnold, 131 Fed. 723 (1904).
15 Codt v. Wiltse, 130 Iowa 139, 105 N. W. 510 (1906).
'-McKee v. Beale, 13 Ky. (3 Litt.) 190 (1823).
1 Golden v. Lewis, 176 Ky. 28, 195 S. W. 144 (1917); Evans Admrs.,
et al. v. Clinton Bank, et al., 244 Ky. 270, 50 S. W. (2d) 563 (1932);
Collins v. Rickart, 77 Ky. (14 Bush) 621 (1879).
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if he takes no other security, whether a conveyance has been made or
not."
The rule in Kentucky appears to be that the right to a decree of
specific performance of a contract relating to realty or personalty is
based on the fact that damages for breach cannot be adequately com-
pensated for in law." There are very few cases in Kentucky granting
specific performance of an executory contract in favor of the vendor,
nor in those few do the courts state the basis for the holding.
After an analytical examination of the authorities it does not
appear that the court of equity regards so material the particular
thing asked for. The complainant may either desire a specific thing
or a sum of money. The court regards the position of the party asking
the relief rather than the subject matter of the contract. It is the
relation of the particular Individual to the subject matter which the
court regards as important. The question is, considering the individ-
ual and the relief which he could under the circumstances secure at
law, is the legal remedy as to him adequate? If not, he will be grant-
ed specific performance even though he asked only for a sum of money.
This relief will be granted, not on the theory of mutuality or fore-
closure of redemption, but merely because of the inadequacy of the
remedy at law.
JOHN EVANiS.
A STERILIZATION LAW FOR KENTUCKY-ITS
CONSTITUTIONALITY
Proposed statute:
(1) Whenever the Superintendent or Warden of the State's re-
formatories or hospitals for the insane or feeble-minded shall be of the
opinion that it is for the best interest of the patient or inmate and
society that any inmate of the institution under his care should be
sexually sterilized, such superintendent or warden is hereby author-
ized to cause to be performed by some capable physician or surgeon
the operation of sterilization on any patient or inmate confined in
such institution affected with insanity, idiocy, imbecility, feeble-
mindedness, or epilepsy: provided that such superintendent or warden
shall have first complied with the requirements of this act.
(2) Such superintendent or warden shall first present to the
trustees or managers of his hospital or reformatory a petition stating
the facts of the cause and the ground of his opinion, verified by his
affidavit to the best of his knowledge and belief and praying that an
order may be entered by said trustees or managers requiring them to
have performed by some competent physician to be designated by him
in his petition or by said trustees or managers in their order upon the
-Farmer & Arnold v. Samuel, 14 Ky. 187 (1823).
" Edelen v. W. B. Samuel & Co., 126 Ky. 295, 130 S. W. 360 (1907).
